Indiana Journal of Global Legal
Studies
Volume 20

Issue 2

Article 15

Summer 2013

Fundamental Rights, Private Law, and Societal Constitution: On
the Logic of the So-Called Horizontal Effect
Florian Roedl
Goeth-University, roedl@zerp.uni-bremen.de

Follow this and additional works at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ijgls
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, International Law Commons, and the Transnational Law
Commons

Recommended Citation
Roedl, Florian (2013) "Fundamental Rights, Private Law, and Societal Constitution: On the Logic of the SoCalled Horizontal Effect," Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies: Vol. 20 : Iss. 2 , Article 15.
Available at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ijgls/vol20/iss2/15

This Symposium is brought to you for free and open
access by the Law School Journals at Digital Repository
@ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies by an authorized
editor of Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. For more
information, please contact rvaughan@indiana.edu.

Fundamental Rights, Private Law, and
Societal Constitution: On the Logic of the
So-Called Horizontal Effect
FLORIAN RODL (FRANKFURT/MAIN)*
ABSTRACT

The paper raises the issue of a normative justification of the
horizontal effect of fundamental rights in private law. Justification in
this sense means that the reasons given are neither functional nor
instrumental, but that the reasons are supposed to be subject to the
intrinsic logic of private law. In traditionaldoctrine, the reason usually
given to confer horizontal effect to fundamental rights is a deferral to the
constitution: The constitutional text decides whether and how
fundamental rights apply to private legal relationships. This answer
implies that fundamental rights are either logically or normatively alien
to private law, that they are located in a logical or normative room
beyond the logical room of private law. In contrast to this prevailing
opinion, the paper argues that, first, private law is logically prior to
fundamental rights, and that, second, fundamental rights are part of
private law's intrinsic normative logic. This is developed for the class of
democratic rights that includes all rights besides anti-discrimination
rights and classical civil rights. If the argument is cogent, then it can
also explain why fundamental rights also apply, including horizontal
effect, in the sphere of transnational legal regimes, subject to the
transnationaljurisdictionof state courts and internationaltribunals.
INTRODUCTION

In Gunther Teubner's concept and vision of "transnational societal
constitutionalism," fundamental rights play an essential role. 1 The
sociological function of their effectuation is to confront a transnational
* Research Group Director at the Cluster of Excellence, "On the Formation of
Normative Orders," Johann Wolfgang Goethe-University.
1. GUNTHER TEUBNER, CONSTITUTIONAL FRAGMENTS: SOCIETAL CONSTITUTIONALISM
AND GLOBALIZATION 124 (2012).
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system, organized according to a transnational legal regime, with
functional imperatives of its environments. Fundamental rights serve to
restrain the relevant system's dynamics; they force it to cope with and
to adapt to the functional needs of its environments; they block the
regime's unlimited expansionism.2 Moreover, given that societal
constitutions are not public, but either private or, at the most, hybrid in
character, fundamental rights must be binding not only for public
actors, but for private actors as well.3 But this traditional concept of
horizontal effect is only the starting point for Teubner's more
demanding idea of a-let us say-general societal effect of fundamental
rights. In this sense, the further elaboration of horizontal effect of
fundamental rights in private law is a cornerstone of Teubner's
normative hopes and expectations in "transnational constitutionalism."
The horizontal effect of fundamental rights in private law is also the
subject of this paper. This paper will try to illuminate the logical role of
fundamental rights in private law. But before developing this subject
further, it seems helpful to start with a preliminary remark. The
problem identified in this paper does not play a major role in Teubner's
work. This is not due to a simple shortcoming that could be improved.
Rather, it is due to Teubner's general choice of his theoretical approach
to law. This needs further elaboration, at least in brief.
I. A "DISPUTE BETWEEN THE FACULTIES" IN LEGAL THEORY
Gunther Teubner's work is based on the view, which is shared by
many other legal scholars, that law fulfills an essentially societal
function. The basic idea is that we can understand and shape law best if
we describe and interpret its principles from a sociological perspective
and use sociological vocabulary. Although Teubner also claims that law
and its basic concepts do have an intrinsic meaning, 4 this meaning is
not the last line of understanding. Full understanding of the law
requires translating the law's concepts into sociological constellations
and imperatives. For this reason, law cannot guide its own development
in normative terms. Instead, law must adopt orientations gained (with
sociological means) from areas outside the law and only then translate
them into its own vocabulary.
The following quotation by Teubner on the topic of this paper, the
horizontal effect of fundamental rights, can illustrate this point:

2. See id. at 132-34.
3. See id. at 131-32.
4. See, e.g., Gunther Teubner, How the Law Thinks: Toward a Constructivist
Epistemology of Law, 23 LAW & SOc'Y REV. 727 (1989).
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The ensuing question for lawyers is: Can 'horizontal'
effects of human rights be reformulated from a focus of
conflicts within society (person versus person) to
conflicts
between
society
and
its
ecologies
(communication versus body/mind)? In other words, can
horizontal effects be transplanted from the paradigm of
interpersonal conflicts between individual bearers of
fundamental rights to that of conflicts between
anonymous communicative processes, on the one hand,
and concrete people on the other?5
Translating normative sociology into legal doctrine is, of course, a
difficult task,6 not least because today's legal vocabulary is usually
obsolete, as it is the product of a bygone societal context.
This paper is based on the opposite hypothesis: law does not fulfill a
function, but has an intrinsic meaning. Law is a moral category; it
represents a fundamental, human relationship, be it between equals (as
in private law) or between the individual and a community (as in public
law). Law cannot be explained first and foremost by sociological means.
It must be illuminated using conceptual means. An elaboration of the
basic legal concepts can itself be' a source and a reason for developing
law further. Legal theory, inasmuch as it deals with the basic concepts
of the law, is therefore, first and foremost, a subspecies of philosophy.
Of course, this argument does not mean to declare sociology of law
to be uninteresting, and not from the perspective of jurisprudence,
either. It only means to dispute the claim by legal sociology that it is the
true basis of (understanding) law. The situation is like that of legal
history. It, too, is not the true basis of law, 7 but rather a subdiscipline of
history. Accordingly, legal sociology is not the true basis of law, either,
but a subdiscipline of sociology.
There is a "dispute between the faculties" 8 lying dormant here that
concerns the fundamental approach to law. It will not be pursued here
5. TEUBNER, supra note 1, at 146.
6. Teubner seems to reject an idea of translation, but speaks about "irritation" of the
doctrinal perspective, e.g. Gunther Teubner, Das Projekt der Verfassungssoziologie:
Irritationen des nationalstaatlichen Konstitutionalismus [The Project of Constitutional
Sociology: Irritating Nation State Constitutionalism], 32 Zeitschrift fir Rechtssoziologie
189 (2011) (Ger.). But it is supposed that the result of such "irritation" is not meant to be
random.
7. Even though such claims are indeed still raised for private law. See, e.g., REINHARD
ZIMMERMANN, ROMAN LAW, CONTEMPORARY LAw, EUROPEAN LAW: THE CIVILIAN
TRADITION TODAY (2001).
8. Cf. IMMANUEL KANT, DER STREIT DER FAKULTATEN, IN KANTs WERKE. AKADEMIE
TEXTAUSGABE (Akademie-Ausgabe ed., 1968 (1798))

1018

INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 20:2

in substance. But it is worth noting the contrast between Teubner's
approach and the one presupposed in this paper: legal theory as
sociology with legal doctrine as the medium for transposing the
sociology's normative orientations on the one hand, and, on the other
hand, legal theory as philosophy, which can directly guide legal doctrine
because it builds a conceptual continuum to it.
The methodological opposition between the sociological approach,
which is also Teubner's, and the philosophical approach, which is
followed in this paper, leads to the effect, that this paper asks a
question that does not seem to need an answer in Teubner's view. As
stated above, this paper uses as a starting point Teubner's claim for an
advanced elaboration of the horizontal effect of fundamental rights to
bring them to bear within autonomous transnational civil constitutions.
In this context, the jurisdiction of courts and tribunals, which
represents unity and autonomy of the transnational constitutional
subject, has a salient role to play. Their achievement is usually to bring
fundamental rights to bear in the relevant societal sphere. Against this
backdrop, one particular question needs to be answered from a legal
point of view: How can the effectuation of horizontal effect be justified,
and this means justified in legal terms, in the logic of the law? Teubner
apparently asks these questions: "How ... can fundamental rights claim
validity in transnational regimes .. . ? Do fundamental rights within
such regimes oblige also private actors . .. ?"9 His answer is not given

from the internal perspective of the law, but from an outside, legal
realist perspective: "It is the decision practice of transnational regimes
themselves that enacts fundamental rights within their borders."10 This
claim is certainly true, but it is not an answer to the question whether
the decisions of those courts or tribunals are correct from the viewpoint
of the law.
Nothing is wrong with this from Teubner's methodological
perspective. But from the philosophical approach's perspective, a
justification for the horizontal effect is indeed required. It becomes even
more urgent, if the jurisdiction on transnational disputes, especially by
arbitration tribunals, comes into focus because, as will be explained
later, the horizontal effect of fundamental rights is much less developed
in this context than it is in the context of state court jurisdiction on
domestic disputes. And the project of justification will bring about an
idea of private law as societal constitution, an idea that has some
connections with Teubner's idea of societal constitutionalism, but, as
will turn out later, is not identical.

9. TEUBNER, supra note 1, at 125.

10. Id. at 129.
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So, the rest of the paper will argue for a justification of the
horizontal effect of fundamental rights in private law, which can also
justify its effectuation in the sphere of transnational private legal
regimes. In this justificatory sense, it is about the logic of fundamental
rights in private law. However, the whole argument cannot start with
an established justification of the well-known effect of fundamental
rights in a state's domestic private law. No doubt, clear responses to the
doctrinal construction of the effect of basic rights are available in
private law. But their normative justification is seldom discussed (see
Section II). From a philosophical perspective, the question as to a
justification certainly does pose a challenge. The historical circumstance
that private law is older than direct fundamental rights derived from a
state constitution initially suggests that the substance of fundamental
rights is alien to private law in and of itself. In the following, it will be
argued for the opposite position: the effect of fundamental rights can be
explained employing the logic of private law itself. The horizontal effect
of fundamental rights is inherent to private law, which constitutes the
character of private law as a societal constitution (see Section III). And
this allows new conclusions for the problem of the horizontal effect of
fundamental rights in the area of transnational legal relationships (see
Section IV).
II. STARTING OVER: FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND PRIVATE LAW
In this section, it will be discussed once more the problem of the
effect of fundamental rights in private law as it is encountered in
domestic law, in the framework of the state, and under the
(counterfactual) assumption of a national society at home in that
framework. Three aspects are to be discussed in this context: First, the
aspect of the logical relationship between fundamental rights and
private law (see Section II.A.), then the aspect of the doctrinal
construction of the effects of fundamental rights in private law (see
Section II.B.), and finally the aspect of the justification of the effect of
fundamental rights (see Section II.C.).
A. On the Logical Relationship Between FundamentalRights and
PrivateLaw
The way in which the discussion about the horizontal effect of
fundamental rights was originally framed has made that debate prone
to misunderstandings to this day. Because the question about the
horizontal effect is raised, one must get the impression that
fundamental rights and private law constitute two orders that are

1020

INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 20:2

logically independent of one another. Logically independent means that
each order can be understood without the other. The impression of
logical independence came about because of the open question about a
horizontal effect. This implied a clear dividing line: on one side are the
fundamental rights; they apply to the relationship of the citizen to the
state. On the other side is private law; it applies to the relationship
between citizens." In principle, each is independent of the other. So the
question necessarily arises whether the dividing line between the orders
of fundamental rights and private law is to be transcended nonetheless
by the horizontal effect, and consequently, only constitutional law can
answer this question.

1. Logical Primacy of the FundamentalRights?
Of course, the notion that the orders of fundamental rights and
private law are logically independent is wrong. Instead, there is a
logical dependence between the two; one rests on the other. There are
two possibilities: Either the order of fundamental rights is basic to the
order of private law, or the order of private law is basic to the order of
fundamental rights. According to the first position, fundamental rights
seem fundamental if one reads private law as applied constitutional law
and, therefore, analyzes private-law legislation as a practice of
balancing fundamental rights. 12
The disadvantage of this view is that, at the least, it enters into a
somewhat uncomfortable tension with the conceptual work performed in
the past and the present on providing conceptual foundations for
private-law norms, in particular the norms concerning fundamental
institutions such as property, contract, and tort. For example, the
question why a contract presupposes offer and acceptance,
consideration, and substantive fairness can be answered by drawing on
theories of property as instantiating external freedom which must lead
to the right to alienation through contract.13 The claim of logical

11. GUNTER DORIG, Grundrechte und Zivilrechtsprechung [Fundamental Rights and
Adjudication], in FESTSCHRIFT FOR HANS NAWIASKY 183 (1956) ("[E]s geht [bei der
Drittwirkung, F.R.] um die Erhaltung der privatrechtlichen Eigenstandigkeit").
12. See, e.g., ROBERT ALExY, A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 363 (2002);
KONRAD HESSE, VERFASSUNGSRECHT UND PRIVATRECHT (1998); Matthias Kumm, Who is
Afraid of the Total Constitution, 7 GERMAN L.J. 341, 359 (2006) ("Conceptually then,
private law, like any law in Germany, qualifies as a branch of applied constitutional
law.").
13. PETER BENSON, The Unity of Contract Law, in THE THEORY OF CONTRACT LAW 118
(Peter Benson ed., 2001). See also the rich philosophical work on tort law: PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT (Robert Chambers et al. eds., 2009);
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primacy of fundamental rights implying that the private law norms are
products of balancing fundamental rights declares that any work of this
kind on conceptual foundations is obsolete.
Now, one may try to rescue the claim of logical primacy of
fundamental rights by stating that it is only a meta-commentary that in
turn only illuminates what is actually happening in such work on
fundamental concepts. It is indeed true that, as a meta-commentary, it
need not imply that expressing what is actually happening in terms of
balancing fundamental rights could replace such conceptual work.
Unfortunately, the claim, read as a meta-commentary, is evidently
wrong. Balancing includes precisely a characteristic aspect of subjective
valuation, an aspect of something conceptually underdetermined.
Precisely such an aspect, however, has no place in a conceptual
foundation. Otherwise, that foundation fails to be conceptual.

2. Logical Primacy of PrivateLaw
From the alternative perspective, private law is basic to
fundamental rights. This results even from the fact that fundamental
rights are occasionally about private law: the guarantees of property
rights and inheritance law, for example, or of marriage and family. But
"corporation" and "association" also belong in this category. For these
cases, it seems clear that fundamental right would not be
understandable without the articulations in private law. For instance,
we would not be able to understand what "property rights"14 are if we
did not already know that according to private law, property grants its
owner the right to dispose of the property as he pleases and to exclude
everyone else from using it. The relevant provision in private law is not
a definition of property rights, but rather their constitution. 5 This
constitutive achievement in private law is taken up by the fundamental
right; so logically speaking, the fundamental right presupposes its
constitution in private law.
The same structure is also to be found in other cases. For instance,
obtaining a material livelihood by practicing a profession (Article 12
German Basic Law) takes place through contracts, at least contracts in
which the efforts of the person practicing the profession, whether
freelancer or employee, are purchased and remunerated. Freedom of
PHILOSOPHIcAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW (David G. Owen ed., 1995); and PHILOSOPHY
AND THE LAW OF TORTS (Gerald J. Postema ed., 2001).
14. Cf. Art. 14 of the German Basic Law (GBL). In the following, the paper occasionally
refers to German law. This is done just for the purpose of illustration. Any particularities
of the German version of the law do not play a systematic role in the argument.
15. Cf. Sec. 903 of the German Civil Code.
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occupation, as a negative right directed against the state, must
therefore presuppose contractual freedom under private law, for a legal
order without contractual freedom under private law would not be able
to guarantee the fundamental right of freedom of occupation. In this
respect, private law makes a constitutive contribution to the substance
of the fundamental right. This contribution by private law must already
be understood if one is to understand the substance of the fundamental
right.
Finally, however, logical primacy must be affirmed in the case of all
other fundamental rights that do not concern or presuppose private-law
institutions. This primacy lies in the fact that the fundamental rights in
question always presuppose the individual's freedom to act, including
the right to property as its objective aspect. For example, the freedom of
expression directed against the state 6 presupposes that freedom of
expression exists in societal space as well. In societal space, however,
freedom of expression is in fact made possible first of all via private law:
equality of rights and the protection of physical integrity prohibit
anyone from hindering the individual from expressing his or her opinion
or requiring him or her to have a particular opinion. 17
In other words, fundamental rights presuppose private law. At least
the general freedom to act, but beyond that, the more specific
institutions of private law, such as property or contract, must already be
in place for the substance of the individual fundamental rights to
become comprehensible.
3. No Normative Primacy of PrivateLaw
This finding can also be expressed in another way: If fundamental
rights presuppose constitutive achievements of private law for the
societal sphere, then this implies that fundamental rights presuppose
their horizontal effect by means of private law in the societal realm. At
first glance, it seems a logical consequence of this observation that the
horizontal effect of fundamental rights must be negated as a matter of
principle. For if the substance of the fundamental rights is itself
represented in private law and is realized by means of private law, then
it seems that no room remains for any horizontal effect. This conclusion
has in fact been drawn, albeit in a weakened form.' 8
16. Cf. Art. 5 (1) 1 GBL.
17. This was already observed by Immanuel Kant. See IMMANUEL KANT, METAPHYSICS
OF MORALS (Mary Gregor ed., 1996) (remarking on the implications of innate right,
including (horizontal) freedom of expression).
18. Uwe Diederichsen, Die Rangverhdltnisse zwischen den Grundrechten und dem
Privatrecht [The Hierarchy Between Fundamental Rights and Private Law], in
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The logical primacy of private law, however, does not imply its
normative primacy. It would be wrong to assume that the traditional
functioning of private law had always realized, quasi automatically and
without further reflection, the content of fundamental rights in the
societal sphere. Otherwise, the whole debate on horizontal effect would
seem rather awkward, because there would have been and could have
been no cases which raise the question of correcting the usual operation
of private law by horizontal effect. The reason why private law is to be
submitted to horizontal effect is that private law itself provides the
means to deprive individuals of their fundamental rights. These means
are contract, on the one hand, and tort claims on the other. With
contract, one can voluntarily accept restrictions of action that fall under
the description of fundamental rights. The same applies for tort claims:
One can restrict another's action if that person interferes with property
rights or protected financial interests. The question that the discussion
about horizontal effect is actually about is whether and to what extent a
normative horizontal effect contradicts such restrictions.
B. The DoctrinalConstruction of the Effect of FundamentalRights
Recently, several authors have conducted comparative-law studies
on the doctrine of the effect of fundamental rights in private law.19 The
findings suggest that there are a limited number of basic types in which
20
the effect of fundamental rights is to be constructed in doctrinal terms.
In synthesis, there are only two relevant types: the doctrine of direct
horizontal effect and the doctrine of an indirect horizontal effect of
RANGORDNUNG DER GESETZE [HIERARCHY OF LAWS] 39, 70 (Christian Starck ed., 1994)
(Ger.); Werner Flume, Rechtsgeschdft und Privatautonomie[Business Law and Personal
Autonomy], in HUNDERT JAHRE DEUTSCHES RECHTSLEBEN: FESTSCHRIFT ZUM
HUNDERTJAHRIGEN BESTEHEN DES DEUTSCHEN JURISTENTAGES [ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF
GERMAN LEGAL LIFE. COMMEMORATIVE PUBLICATION FOR THE CENTENNIAL ANNIVERSARY
OF THE GERMAN LAWYERS DAY] 135, 140 (Ernst V. Caemmerer et al. eds., 1960) (Ger.); Jan
in
Skeptical View,
and Fundamental Rights: a
Private Law
Smits,
CONSTITUTIONALISATION OF PRIVATE LAW 9 (Tom Barkhuysen & Siewert D. Lindenbergh
eds., 2006).
19. FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND PRIVATE LAW IN THE EUROPEAN UNION, VOL. I: A
COMPARATIVE OVERVIEW (Gert Bruiggemeier et al. eds., 2010); Mattias Kumm & Victor
Ferreres Comella, What is so Special About Constitutional Rights in PrivateLitigation? A
Comparative Analysis of the Function of State Action Requirements and Indirect
Horizontal Effect, in THE CONSTITUTION IN PRIVATE RELATIONS (AndrAs Saj6 & RenAta
Uitz eds., 2005); Ulrich K. Preuf3, The Guarantee of Rights: Horizontal Rights, in TRAITt
INTERNATIONAL DER DROIT CONSTITUTIONAL. VOL. III: SUPRAMATIE DE LA CONSTITUTION
(Michel Troper & Dominique Chagnollaud eds., 2012).
20. See id.; see also Aharon Barak, Constitutional Human Rights and Private Law, in
HUMAN RIGHTS IN PRIVATE LAW, (Daniel Friedman & Daphne Barak-Erez eds., 2001).
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fundamental rights by way of "radiation" (Ausstrahlung)into private
law.
The doctrine of a direct effect assumes that fundamental rights also
have effects in situations between private parties. 21 However, it
assumes that the effect is modified compared with the effect toward the
state, because even when a private party is accused of interfering with
the fundamental rights of another party, that party may mobilize
opposing fundamental rights of his or her own. That is why, this
doctrine states, the content of guaranteeing fundamental rights between
private parties is different from guaranteeing fundamental rights
vis-A-vis the state. 22
The alternative view denies any effects of fundamental rights as
rights in private law. Nonetheless, there is a dimension of the effect of
fundamental rights. 23 Fundamental rights have effects as values and, as
such, provide orientation for the formation of concepts in private law.
For example, fundamental rights provide orientation as to what is
considered unconscionable, in bad faith, and inequitable. They offer a
guiding principle as to what are legitimate interests worthy of
protection. They can be a point of reference for determining which rights
are protected from violations by any third parties and which
justifications can be put forward for interventions in the rights of third
parties. This effect of forming concepts of private law by providing
orientation is often expressed with the vivid term "radiation"

(Ausstrahlung).24
21. Barak, supranote 20, at 14.
22. See the seminal article HANS CARL NIPPERDEY, Grundrechte und Privatrecht:Eine
Universittitsrede [Fundamental Law and Private Law. A University Lecture], in
FESTSCHRIFT FUR ERICH MOLITOR [COMMEMORATIVE PUBLICATION FOR ERICH MOLITOR]
17 (Verlag C.H. Beck ed., 1962); and also WALTER LEISNER, GRUNDRECHTE UND
PRIVATRECHT [FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND PRIVATE LAw] 356 (1960).

23. Lorraine E. Weinrib & Ernest J. Weinrib, ConstitutionalValues and PrivateLaw in
Canada, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN PRIVATE LAW 43 (Daniel Friedmann & Daphne Barak-Erez
eds., 2001) (reflecting the position of the Supreme Court of Canada in Dolphin Delivery
and Hill v. Church of Scientology and of the German Federal Constitutional Court in the
famous Liith-decision). See also, the path-breaking German article for Liith, DORIG, supra
note 11.
24. It is argued that there is a doctrinal alternative to horizontal effect, namely the
(state-)court's duty to protect against violations of fundamental rights by third parties.
Path-breaking was Claus-Wilhelm Canaris, Grundrechte und Privatrecth [Fundamental
Rights and PrivateRights], 184 ARCHIV FOR DIE CIVILISTISCHE PRAXIS 201 (1984) (Ger.).

But although this has become the prevailing opinion in legal academia, see MATTHIAS
RUFFERT, VORRANG DER VERFASSUNG UND EIGENSTANDIGKEIT DES PRIVATRECHTS: EINE
VERFASSUNGSRECHTLICHE
UNTERSUCHUNG
ZUR
PRIVATRECHTSWIRKUNG
DES
GRUNDGESETZES [PRIORITY OF THE CONSTITUTION AND THE INDEPENDENCE OF PRIVATE
LAW. A CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECTS OF THE BASIC LAW' IN PRIVATE LAW]

(2001) (Ger.). It actually provides no alternative at all: the court fulfills its duty to protect
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C. The Normative Justificationof the Effect of FundamentalRights
How can the horizontal effect of fundamental rights be justified,
once it has been construed doctrinally in one way or the other? One type
of justification is particularly important to legal scholars, namely the
positivist justification. In this regard, the question about justification is
why the law requires that fundamental rights have an effect in private
law. But that is not the point to be discussed here; the question is,
rather, whether the effect of fundamental rights in private law can be
understood as reasonable.
It is remarkable that this question is examined only rarely, at least
in Germany. Observations from a previous layer of discussion following
the discovery of the effect of fundamental rights via court decisions
provide the closest thing to an answer. They are roughly as follows: in
the twentieth century, threats to fundamental rights no longer
emanated from the state alone, but precisely from powerful private
parties or bearers of societal power, which usually means incorporated
companies and associations. 25 More recently, Teubner has argued that
even "structural violence," though not a legal person, but an
"anonymous matrix" that is threatening the individual's freedom, could
and must be tamed by horizontal effect. 26 In order to protect the
individual from these forms of .power and violence, fundamental rights
must be brought into a position, which, the argument goes, justifies that
the binding of fundamental rights basically also applies to private
parties.
From a philosophical perspective in legal theory, the question about
the justification of the effect of fundamental rights has even more
specific significance. The question is not about any nonpositivist
justification at all. Such a justification could simply amount to the claim
that fundamental rights are very important and even more important
by articulating the radiation of fundamental rights in private law. However, the doctrine
based on the state's duty to protect may add some methodological guidance to determine
the content of radiation.
25. See generally ERNST-WOLFGANG BOCKENFORDE, Freiheitssicherung gegentiber
gesellschaftlicher Macht: Aufriss eines Problems [Securing Freedom over Social Power.
Outline of a Problem], in STAAT, GESELLSCHAFT, FREIHEIT: STUDIEN ZUR STAATSTHEORIE
UND ZUM VERFASSUNGSRECHT[STATE, SOCIETY, FREEDOM] 1529 (1976); DIETER GRIMM,
Grundrechte und Privatrecht in der birgerlichenSozialordnung [FundamentalRights and
Private Rights in the Bourgeois Social Order], in RECHT UND STAAT DER BIRGERLICHEN
GESELLSCHAFT [LAW AND STATE OF CIVIL SOCIETY] 192 (1987) (Ger.).
26. See generally Gunther Teubner, The Anonymous Matrix: Human Rights Violations
by 'Private' TransnationalActors, 69 MOD. L. REV. 327 (2006) (arguing that since their
violations of fundamental rights stem from totalizing tendencies of partial rationalities,
there is no longer any point in seeing the horizontal effect as if rights of private actors
have to be weighed up against each other).
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than private law. The philosophical question is whether the effect of
fundamental rights can be justified with the same conceptual means
that form the basis of the provisions of private law. In other words, it is
about whether the horizontal effect of fundamental rights is inherent to
private law, or whether the effect is a mandate that affects private law
from the outside. In the latter case, the effect of fundamental rights
would in fact require a basis in constitutional law. In the former case,
private law would actually have to develop the results of the effect of
fundamental rights from within itself, even without a constitutional
basis.
III. THE LOGICAL FUNCTION OF DEMOCRATIC FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS

A. Three Types of FundamentalRights
Due to restricted space, the following section will not provide an
exhaustive account of a justification of the effect of all fundamental
rights. It will be restricted to the effect of democratic rights. Democratic
rights form one among three classes of rights that must be
distinguished in this context of horizontal effect in private law. The two
other classes are anti-discrimination rights regarding categories such as
race or gender and classical civil rights, which are constituted by private
law, including the right to physical integrity, occupational freedom, the
freedom to form corporations and collective bargaining, property rights,
contractual freedom, and the protection of marriage and the family.
The application of nondiscrimination rights in private law is subject
to extensive and contentious debate, 27 which this paper cannot add to in
substance. It must suffice, for the current context, to acknowledge that
there are voices that claim that anti-discrimination law can be
illuminated as an internal characteristic of private law. 28
Civil rights, it has already been observed above, are constituted by
private law rules. They are not treated here in substance either, because
it is doubtful whether they indeed have a role to play in private law. It
is most likely that the problems that courts have answered or may
answer in the future by way of application of civil fundamental rights

27. See BENSON, supra note 13; ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, FORCE AND FREEDOM: KANT'S
LEGAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 287-92 (2009); Eduard Picker, Antidiskriminierungals
Zivilrechtsprogramm? [Anti-discrimination as a Program for Private Law?], 58
JURISTENZEITUNG 540 (2003) (Ger.); see also Amnon Reichman, Property Rights, Public
Policy and the Limits of the Legal Power to Discriminate, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN PRIVATE
LAW (Daniel Friedmann & Daphne Barak-Erez eds., 2001).
28. See RIPSTEIN, supranote 27; Reichman, supra note 27.
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dissolve when one accepts that the doctrine of contract includes the
ideas of contractual fairness and a fair price.
All the other fundamental rights, besides nondiscrimination rights
and civil rights, shall be subsumed in the rubric of democratic
fundamental rights. Of course, this is a conceptual gambit, which would
actually require a more extensive justification for which there is no
room here. This group includes the general freedoms of speech and
communication) 29, including the privacy of communications,30 freedom of
assembly, 31 and the freedom to form noncommercial associations. 32 This
category also includes the nonpersonal rights of freedom of the press
and of reporting by means of broadcasts and films, 33 as well as the
freedom of sciences and the arts. 34 After all, science and art are special
forms of thought and action that are part of democratic communication,
but the intrinsic logic of each justifies a special position in the catalogue
of fundamental rights. Finally, freedom of faith and conscience 35 can be
categorized in this group, although, historically, these rights are
certainly older than the constitutional democracy. However, democratic
statehood is also normatively linked to a plurality of worldviews. A
constitutional democracy without freedom of faith and conscience would
be considered defective as a democracy, and not defective as something
else. In this sense, it is suggested that all of these fundamental
rights-and that is the decisive thesis for the following-can be
described in terms of a theory of democracy. 36

B. Justificationof the Effect of DemocraticFundamentalRights
In the case of democratic fundamental rights, it is not the behavior
protected by fundamental rights, but the corresponding potentiality for
action that is constituted by private law. In this respect, the
fundamental right does not take up an institution of private law, but
rather specifies a particular action enabled by means of private law and
29. Cf. Art. 5 Sec. 1 GBL.
30. Cf. Art. 10 GBL.
31. Cf. Art. 8 Sec. 1 GBL.
32. Cf. Art. 9 Sec. 1 GBL.
33. Cf. Art. 5 Sec. 1 GBL.
34. Cf. Art. 5 Sec. 3 GBL.
35. Cf. Art. 4 Sec. 1 GBL.
36. Such an analysis does not imply to curtail the relevant rights in substance. See
Ernst-Wolfgang B6ckenfbrde, Grundrechtstheorie und Grundrechtsinterpretation[Basic
Theory of Law and Fundamental Rights Interpretation], in NEUE JURISTISCHE
WOCHENSCHRIFT 1529 (1974) (Ger.) (describing the problem of a democratic theory of
fundamental rights if it takes individual rights merely as a function of a democratic
order).
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grants precisely this action special protection on the basis of
fundamental rights. In contrast to civil rights, democratic rights put
particular emphasis on certain potentialities for action which is
apparently not reflected in private law. The point of democratic
fundamental rights is precisely to grant special status to a particular
type of actions, namely those which may have special significance in a
democratic setting: for example, freedom of speech or assembly.
In other words, a justification of the effect of these fundamental
rights that is internal to private law must indicate why it is precisely
the democratic potentialities for action that are granted a special status
by being guaranteed in the form of democratic fundamental rights. Now,
in this context, one could simply point to the fact that democracy is
important and that, therefore, private law should do its part to protect
and promote it. That would not be a justification based on the logic of
private law. Instead, it would mean utilizing the freedom based on civil
rights to advance the concerns of democracy. Conversely, one could just
as well postulate that the concerns of democracy come into their own
only within the confines of freedom based on civil rights, such as when
one considers democracy to be not quite as important as private
autonomy. The question of how important democracy really is would
then, again, be up to constitutional law to answer.
In fact, the justification of the effect of democratic fundamental
rights lies in the fact that the democratic order is a condition for
legitimizing private law. 37 The requirement for legitimation does not
stem from the fact that private law, just as any other law, is also law
that involves coercion. More specifically, private law is dependent on
being embedded in a democratic order. This stems from the fact that
private law demands the public authority of its. rules. After all, one
constitutive of private law as the law constitutive to freedom lies in
property.3 8 Its original emergence is by means of first occupancy. 39 The
first occupancy of an object, however, is a unilateral real act, which at
the same time, imposes obligations on everyone else. This one-sided
obligation by means of a one-sided act can endure only if it is authorized
by a general will. The state represents this general will. Ideally, the
state must generate the general will by means of the democratic
process.

37. See RIPSTEIN, supra note 27, at 182 (noting in the absence of a "united and
lawgiving will," conclusive private rights are impossible).
38. See RIPSTEIN, supranote 27, at 86 ff.
39. See Peter Benson, Philosophy of Property Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW, 759 ff. (Jules Coleman & Scott Schapiro eds.,
2002).

ON THE LOGIC OF THE SO-CALLED HORIZONTAL EFFECT

1029

The formal democratic process in the form of free elections and
parliamentary lawmaking, however, rests upon a democratically
structured society, which is characterized by a societal realization of the
democratic rights, such as freedom of speech and communication, the
press, and academic freedom. Political democracy requires "democratic
sociality" (demokratischeGesellschaftlichkeit). Private law would
undermine its own basis of legitimation if it were to permit private-law
means to undermine this democratic sociality. Democratic fundamental
rights characterize those structures that are relevant for the
legitimation of private law. Precisely for this reason, democratic
fundamental rights must become effective in private law based on the
logic of private law itself.
Of course, an opponent will ask why a punctual intrusion by
private-law means into the democratic structure and process should
endanger private law's legitimation as a whole. If, to use a suggestive
example, one person sells his right to free speech for a good price, why
should this single instance of distortion put private law's legitimacy into
question? The answer is that the democratic structure is a whole whose
parts and aspects are not at an individual's disposal. Democracy
includes and might partly even consist of individual rights. But the
individual rights are not the individual person's means to be used for
his or her individual purposes which would, for example, allow selling
them in contract. The legitimizing power of democracy comes from the
holistic structure and not from the sum of multiple exercises of
individual rights. It comes from the holistic structure because it is not
possible to draw the line: How many single instances of distortion are
acceptable? How many people may sell their right to free speech so that
we nevertheless see democracy in place? That we cannot answer these
questions is the logical proof that legitimacy comes from the holistic
structure and not from the democratic rights of a multitude of
individuals.

C. Private Law as Societal Constitution
From a pure private law perspective, the effect of fundamental
rights in private law cannot be readily elaborated. The effect of
fundamental rights seems to be disrupting private law's conceptual
harmony. 40 This disruption can, of course, always be justified by
referring to the will of the democratic creator of laws or the constitution.
But that would mean that reflecting on private law according to reason
cannot catch up to the effect of fundamental rights. The effect of
40. See supranote 18.
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fundamental rights in turn would not be described as reasonable, but
only as politically driven. This consequence could be avoided if
fundamental rights could be brought into the conceptual framework of
private law as residing in reason.
In their traditional function, fundamental rights secure institutions
and potentialities for action constituted according to private law against
state interventions. 41 Within private law, in contrast, they do not
develop a constitutive function, but an expressive one: Fundamental
rights explain democratic freedom, which serves as the basis for
legitimizing private law. Legitimation comes into play not only when
fundamental rights are actually part of valid law. Via fundamental
rights, legitimation is only brought to bear expressively. In this respect,
the discovery of the effect of fundamental rights in private law does not
imply a "constitutionalization" of private law. Rather, fundamental
rights express the constitutional character always inherent to private
law. Private law itself has a constitutional character. Private law is a
free and democratic societal constitution.
This character as a societal constitution, however, pertains only to
that part of private law valid as law and not, for example, to complex
contractual agreements, even if they may have developed an
"auto-constitutional" character. 42 Such complex contractual agreements
are not different versions of societal constitution, but rather
potentialities below the level of a private law societal constitution.
IV.

TRANSNATIONAL SOCIETAL CONSTITUTION

Now, what are the effects of the understanding of private law as
societal constitution as developed here in the arena of transnational
civil constitutions? Viewed only from the outside, this is either about
complex contracts-as in the case of the Internet Corporation for
Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN)-or-as in the case of lex
mercatoria-a contractual practice condensed to become a coherent
regime.43 According to the concept of the civil constitution, courts or
court-like benches have a key position as they integrate fundamental
rights into their own order or are tasked with doing so.

41. This understanding is made explicit in Art. 1 Sec. 3 GG: "The following basic rights
shall bind the legislature, the executive and the judiciary as directly applicable law."
42. See Andreas Fischer-Lescano & Gunther Teubner, Regime-Collisions: The Vain
Search for Legal Unity in the Fragmentationof Global Law, 25 MICH. J. INT'L L. 999,
1014-16 (2004) (noting these areas become "auto-constitutional" only when they establish
a close parallel to political constitutions).
43. For an overview of different transnational legal regimes and a systems theoretical
analysis, see id.
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However, many of these benches still follow traditional legal
doctrine in their decision-making. That is the reason for some of the
pitfalls in this context. 44 The understanding of private law based on the
law of societal constitution as developed here might be of help. In order
to provide evidence for such potential, the effect of fundamental rights
in transnational private legal relationships as represented by prevailing
doctrine will serve for illustrative purpose. In the case of transnational
legal relationships between private parties, the judicial function can be
fulfilled by state courts or by arbitration tribunals. In the case of
arbitration tribunals, the doctrinal construct is somewhat more difficult
than in the case of state courts, for which reason the latter will be
treated first.

A. TransnationalLegal RelationshipsBefore State Courts
The decision about rights and obligations arising from transnational
contracts routinely opens up a context pertaining to a conflict of laws.
Provided that the state court considers a contract on the basis of the
private law of its own country, there are no particular difficulties at first
glance. For its own private law has been tasked with the horizontal
effect of fundamental rights by the constitution. Whenever the own
state's private law is applied, the effect of fundamental rights and the
constitution also come into play. However, the reach of fundamental
rights is not necessarily the same as that of legal norms under private
law. If, for example, the applicability of the law of one's own country is
based on the freedom to choose which country's law is to apply, but
there is otherwise no connection to a country's legal order, fundamental
rights do not apply. The case is not sufficiently connected to the state to
justify application of fundamental rights.
If, on the other hand, foreign private law applies, then the
fundamental rights of the country's own legal system routinely apply in
the framework of the international ordre public. But then, it is again
necessary that the case in question displays a sufficient connection to
the country's own legal order. Here, too, the country's own fundamental
rights apply only if the matter or the individuals involved are
sufficiently close to the territorial or personal purview of the state's
constitution and, therefore, to their fundamental rights. In the absence
of a genuine link, the effect of fundamental rights in private law will be
lacking as well. Alternatively, one could consider the fundamental
rights of the legal order applied. But mirroring the limited reach of the

44. See TEUBNER, supra note 1, at 124 (detailing extensively the reasons for some of
the pitfalls).

1032

INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 20:2

fundamental rights belonging to the court's own legal order, the
fundamental rights of the legal order applied have a limited reach,
requiring a sufficient connection. Against this background, only the
fundamental rights of a legal order could be applied, which has
sufficient connection to the case but whose private law does not govern
the case. Such reference to a foreign ordre public has always found little
support. In accordance with Article 21 Rome I Regulation, this is even
prohibited by law in courts in the EU.45
According to the concept developed here, all these difficulties, which
are linked to the highly technical functioning of conflict of laws, which
in turn is hardly transparent to most scholars of fundamental rights
and private law, can be avoided. Whenever state private law is applied,
it must bring to bear the substance of the fundamental rights inherent
to it. It does not matter whether it is the private law of one's own
country or of a foreign one.
Admittedly, this implies a universalization of the substance of
fundamental rights.4 6 Their basis is no longer the specific version of a
particular fundamental right in the legal order of state A, B, or C. The
orientation for the applicability of fundamental rights in transnational
private law must therefore be provided by a universal concept of
democratic order. Elaborating such a concept is the task of all state
courts dealing with disputes of this kind. The guarantees of
fundamental rights in national and international documents may serve
as points of orientation for them. But they are not to search for the
minimum shared by those documents. Instead, it is about the correct
articulation of private law as a free and democratic societal constitution.
B. TransnationalLegal RelationshipsBefore Arbitration Tribunals
In the case of arbitration tribunals, the question as to where a
possible connection to fundamental rights could originate arises as well.
In the case of state courts, according to the traditional doctrine, the
state's constitution requires from the courts as organs of that state that
45. Art. 21 reads: The application of a provision of the law of any country specified by
this Regulation may be refused only if such application is manifestly incompatible with
the public policy (ordre public) of the forum. Article 21 Rome I Regulation, available at
http://eur-lex.europa.euLexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:177:0006:0006:en:PDF
[emphasis added].
46. On the more general need to universalize the ordre public-exeption in conflict of
laws, see FLORIAN RODL, EUROPAISCHEs HOCHSCHULINSTITUT, WELTBORLICHES
KOLLISIONSRECHT: OBER DIE FORM DES KOLLISIONSRECHTS UND SEINE GESTALT IM RECHT
DER EUROPAISCHEN UNION [COSMOPOLITAN CONFLICT OF LAWS. ON THE FORM OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS AND ITS STATURE UNDER THE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN UNION] 173 (2008)
(Ger.).
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fundamental rights are given horizontal effect in private law.
Application of fundamental rights is hence based on the court being an
organ of the state and being located in a particular constitution. An
international arbitration tribunal lacks both: It is not a state arbitration
tribunal, and its verdict is not located within a particular constitutional
order. So, on the basis of the traditional doctrinal construct of the effect
of fundamental rights, it is unclear which fundamental rights could be
given horizontal effect in the private law that is to be applied, and why
it should.
Consequently, a practice of sentencing in reference to fundamental
rights on the part of international arbitration tribunals cannot be
documented in a relevant manner to date. The discussion about an ordre
public transnationalthat would be binding for arbitration tribunals has
produced little of substance apart from a reference to the ius cogens
according to international law. 47 In the practice of arbitration rulings,
where the aspect of an ordrepublic transnationalhas at best identified
a ban on corruption, civil and democratic fundamental rights do not play
any relevant role to date.
The argument developed in this paper why fundamental rights are
to apply in private law closes this gap between fundamental rights on
the one hand and private law administered by arbitration on the other.
The positive fundamental rights express the constitutional substance of
private law without providing the basis for it. Private law must preserve
civil and democratic rights, which both constitute it and render it
possible. Private law must preserve these rights by employing private
law's own resources and means. Therefore, this claim can be sustained
with regard to any system of private law, whether it is situated in a
constitution that guarantees fundamental rights or not.
Accordingly, the function as a state court on the basis of the
constitutional character of private law is not decisive for the effect of
fundamental rights. Every functionally equivalent institution whose
task it is to come to a binding decision about the private rights and
obligations of two conflicting parties on the basis of state private law
must interpret the civil and democratic substance of fundamental rights
accordingly. This holds first of all for arbitration tribunals inasmuch as
they base their decisions on a national system of private law. But it also
applies to the international arbitration tribunals that believe they are
applying an autonomous system of private law, lex mercatoria,for the
lack of a state source does not change anything about the significance of
47. See the comprehensive
case study, MORITZ RENNER,
ZWINGENDES
TRANSNATIONALES RECHT: ZUR STRUKTUR DER WIRTSCHAFTSVERFASSUNG JENSEITS DES
STAATES [MANDATORY TRANSNATIONAL LAW. ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE ECONOMIC
CONSTITUTION BEYOND THE STATE] 91, 191 (2010) (Ger.).
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this autonomous private law, and the purpose is to realize civil liberties.
After all, this is the only basis for its institutions and their norms. The
norms of autonomous private law can be understood only if they are
conceived of as the institutionalization of legal freedom.
The lack of a state source does not change the need for private law
to be created by democratic process under the condition of democratic
sociality, if it is to be legitimate. It is true that the requirement of it
being created by a democratic process, for example as an internationally
agreed system of private law or even a system of universal private law
passed by a world government, is yet to come and will presumably never
become reality. But that does not justify relinquishing the condition of
democratic sociality as well. It is the legitimizing minimum of any
application of private law.
CONCLUSION
This paper has raised the issue of a normative justification of the
horizontal effect of fundamental rights in private law. Justification in
this sense means that the reasons given are supposed to be subject to
the intrinsic logic of the law. In traditional doctrine, the reason usually
given to confer horizontal effect to fundamental rights is a deferral to
the constitutional text. This answer implies that fundamental rights are
logically alien to private law, that they are coming from outside in
logical terms. In contrast to this prevailing opinion, this paper argues
that, first, private law is logically prior to fundamental rights and that
fundamental rights are part of private law's intrinsic logic. This is
developed for the class of democratic rights. If the argument can indeed
be made, then it can also explain why fundamental rights also apply,
including horizontal effect, in the sphere of transnational legal regimes,
subject to the transnational jurisdiction of state courts and
international tribunals.

